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“Elected officials must owe their allegiance to the people, not to their
own wealth or to the wealth of interest groups who speak only for the
1
selfish fringes of the whole community.”
I. INTRODUCTION
Over four decades ago, the people of California, through the initiative
process, enacted the Political Reform Act (the PRA) in support of the proposition
that “[p]ublic officials, whether elected or appointed, should perform their duties
in an impartial manner, free from bias caused by their own financial interests or
2
the financial interests of persons who have supported them.” California’s Office
of the Attorney General referred to the PRA as the single most important conflict

1. Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of
Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1127 (1994) (quoting Senator Barry Goldwater).
2. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(b) (West 2005).
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of interest law in the state. Under the PRA, “[n]o public official at any level of
state or local government shall make, participate in making, or in any way
attempt to use his official position to influence a governmental decision in which
4
he knows or has reason to know he has a financial interest.”
Although the Legislature has made many substantive amendments to the
PRA, a report conducted by the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC)
showed that in 2013, conflict of interest violations involving political campaigns
and lobbying were at the “highest level ever” and that “conflict of interest
5
prosecutions continued at record high levels.” In January 2014, a jury found
Senator Ron Wright guilty of eight felony counts of perjury and voter fraud for
6
fraudulently claiming that he lived in his district. In February, Senator Ron
Calderon and former Assemblymember Tom Calderon, his brother, were indicted
on federal public corruption charges including allegations of mail and wire fraud,
7
bribery, money laundering, and tax fraud. In March, Senator Leland Yee was
arrested for firearm trafficking and accepting a bribe from undercover FBI
8
agents. In April, the FPPC fined Senator Tom Berryhill $40,000 for “serious and
9
deliberate violations” of campaign-finance rules.
In the midst of these corruption scandals, the FPPC issued two record setting
10
fines for violations of the PRA’s lobbying regulations. First, in September 2013
the lobbying firm California Strategies and three of its partners agreed to pay a
11
$40,500 fine for failing to register as lobbyists. Then, in early 2014, lobbyist
Kevin Sloat paid a $133,500 fine, the highest fine ever issued for a violation of
12
the PRA’s lobbying regulations. Sloat violated the PRA by making campaign

3. See GOV’T LAW SECTION CIVIL DIV., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 6
(2010), available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/coi.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (discussing the PRA as “the starting point in any consideration of conflict-of-interest laws in
California”).
4. GOV’T § 87100.
5. John Howard, FPPC: ‘Worst Ever’ Violations in 2013, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://capitolweekly.net/fppc-worst-ever-violations-2013/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Jean Merl, Wright is Guilty of Voter Fraud, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), http://articles.latimes.
com/2014/jan/29/local/la-me-rod-wright-verdict-20140129 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. Melody Gutierrez, State Sen. Ron Calderon, Brother Indicted, S.F. GATE (Feb. 22, 2014),
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/State-Sen-Ron-Calderon-brother-indicted-5256860.php (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
8. Marisa Lagos et al., California State Sen. Yee Arrested in Corruption Case, S.F. GATE (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/California-state-Sen-Yee-arrested-in-corruption-5350602.php (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
9. Jim Miller, FPPC Upholds $40,000 Penalty Against Sen. Tom Berryhill, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 24,
2014), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/fair-political-1/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. See Laurel Rosenhall, California Senate Democrats Propose New Limits on Gifts, Fundraising,
MERCED SUN-STAR (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.mercedsunstar.com/2014/03/07/ 3533744/california-senatedemocrats-propose.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting the criminal charges filed against
Senator Rod Wright for lying about living inside his district and the federal corruption charges filed against
Senators Ron Calderon and Leland Yee).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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contributions to candidates and arranging gifts for candidates. Furthermore, the
FPPC sent warning letters to nearly forty elected officials who had decadent
14
fundraisers at Sloat’s home. The FPPC found that the alcohol and cigars
supplied by Sloat at these events were gifts and that their value exceeded the
15
PRA’s gift limit.
In the aftermath of these scandals, Senate President pro Tempore Steinberg
and Senators Lara, De León, Corbett, Hill, Monning, Roth, and Torres
established the Senate Working Group on Ethics and introduced the California
Accountability in Public Service Act (the CAPS Act) to increase transparency
16
and accountability. The bill package proposed to end the free use of the homes
and offices of registered lobbyists and lobbying firms for campaign fundraisers,
increase the frequency of lobbying report filing, improve electronic access to
17
campaign and lobbying reports, and ban gifts from lobbyists to public officials.
Non-partisan groups supporting greater political transparency applauded the
Senators for taking action to regulate themselves and earn back the public’s
18
trust. Anthony Williams, Policy Director and Special Counsel to Senator
Steinberg, noted, “The American and California system of governance is a model
for the world yet any system needs a periodic review to ensure we are
19
maintaining, achieving, and enhancing our goals.” The Senators who worked on
these bills worked closely with the FPPC for the first time in more than two
decades to identify conflict of interest loopholes in the PRA and sought to close
20
them in order to regain the public’s trust.
Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at USC,
former Chairperson of the FPPC, and recent candidate for California Secretary of
State (SOS), expressed that while the CAPS Act represented progress, it did not
21
accomplish what he considered “broader, more necessary steps.” Sarah
Swanbeck, Policy and Legislative Affairs Advocate for Common Cause, stated,
13. Stipulation, Decision, and Order at 2, Kevin Sloat v. FPPC, No. 13/1201 (Cal. 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
14. Rosenhall, supra, note 10.
15. Id.
16. Senate Elections Committee Advances CA Accountability in Public Service Act (CAPS) Bills, OFFICE
OF SENATOR RICARDO LARA (Apr. 22, 2014), http://sd33.senate.ca.gov/news/2014-04-22-senate-electionscommittee-advances-ca-accountability-public-service-act-caps-bills (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
17. Id.
18. See Christopher Nelson & Alexandra Bjerg, California Legislators Regulating Themselves with New
Transparency Bills, CAFWD.ORG REPORTING (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.cafwd.org/reporting/entry/
california-legislators-regulating-themselves-with-new-transparency-bills (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (explaining that organizations such as California Fwd and other non-partisan groups supporting greater
transparency and improving government trust have endorsed the Senators’ efforts).
19. E-mail from Anthony Williams, Policy Director and Special Counsel to the Senate President pro
Tempore, to Elizabeth Kim, Greensheets Staff Writer, McGeorge Law Review (July 16, 2014, 11:19 PST) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
20. Telephone Interview with Dan Schnur, Director, Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics, USC (July 10,
2014) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. Id.
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“Oftentimes what we’ll see is sort of reactionary legislation to a particular
22
scandal of the day.”
Despite the collaboration and compromises that went into constructing the
CAPS Act, Governor Brown vetoed Senate Bills 1442 and 1443, two of the three
23
bills in the ethics package.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
24

Existing law heavily regulates campaign finances. The PRA requires public
25
officials to disclose the contributions they receive. Current law defines a
contribution, subject to some specified exceptions, as payments, loans, or the
26
forgiveness of loans to candidates. Under a prior exception, if the cost of a
fundraising event, including the market value of the use of the property, to the
occupant of the home or office where the fundraising event occurred was less
than $500, those costs incurred by the occupant were not considered a
27
contribution. Although registered lobbyists are prohibited from making
28
contributions, this exception enabled lobbyists to, in effect, contribute up to
$500 per fundraising event to elected officials by hosting the event in their homes
29
or offices.
The PRA also imposes comprehensive reporting requirements on political
30
entities. During the ninety days preceding an election, candidates and
22. Fenit Nirappil, California Lawmakers Propose Reforms to Regain Public Trust After Series of
Scandals, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20140406/
california-lawmakers-propose-reforms-to-regain-public-trust-after-series-of-scandals (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (raising the concern that legislators are not placing a high priority on political reform
as a long-term goal, but rather treating it as an immediate problem that needs to be addressed in order to move
on to other issue areas so that the public is not disgruntled).
23. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to Members of the Cal. State Senate (Sept. 30, 2014)
[hereinafter SB 1442 Veto Message], available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_1442_Veto_Message.pdf; Letter
from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to Members of the Cal. State Senate (Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter SB
1443 Veto Message], available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_1443_Veto_Message.pdf.
24. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84100–85802 (West 2005).
25. GOV’T § 81002.
26. Id. § 82015(a) (“‘Contribution’ means a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a
third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment except to the extent that full and adequate
consideration is received, unless it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political
purposes.”).
27. Id. § 82015(f) (“‘Contribution’ does not include a payment made by an occupant of a home or office
for costs related to any meeting or fundraising event held in the occupant’s home or office if the costs for the
meeting or fundraising event are five hundred dollars ($500) or less.”).
28. Id. § 85702 (“An elected state officer or candidate for elected state office may not accept a
contribution from a lobbyist, and a lobbyist may not make a contribution to an elected state officer or candidate
for elected state office, if that lobbyist is registered to lobby the governmental agency for which the candidate is
seeking election or the governmental agency of the elected state officer.”).
29. Telephone Interview with Dan Schnur, supra note 20.
30. GOV’T §§ 84100–84511. The PRA specifies a large number of political entities including elected
officers, candidates, candidate controlled committees, committees formed primarily to oppose or support
candidates or ballot measures and general purpose committees. See id. §§ 82007, 82013, 82016, 82021, 82027.5,
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committees must report contributions of at least $1,000 within twenty-four hours
31
of receiving them. Similarly, committees making independent expenditures of at
least $1,000 within ninety days of an election are also required to report that
32
expenditure within twenty-four hours. Additionally, elected officers, candidates,
and committees receiving at least $1,000 in a calendar year must report the
33
contributions they receive on semi-annual statements. Failure to report
contributions properly may subject political entities to administrative, civil, or
34
criminal penalties.
Furthermore, the PRA establishes rules regulating the lobbying industry and
35
lobbyist interactions with public officials. It prohibits a lobbyist from making
36
gifts in aggregate of more than ten dollars per month to any single person.
Public officials, including state and local elected officials or candidates, may not
37
accept gifts worth more than $440 from any source per year.
III. CHAPTER 930, SB 1442, AND SB 1443
With the enactment of three Senate bills, the CAPS Act would have barred
lobbyists from paying for public officials’ fundraising events, increased the
frequency of committee reporting, expanded online reporting and disclosure, and
38
prohibited lobbyists from giving public officials gifts.
Chapter 930 amended the definition of a “contribution” to close a loophole
that allowed lobbyists to host fundraising events and bear up to $500 of the cost
39
of the event. A contribution now “includes a payment made by a lobbyist or a
cohabitant of a lobbyist for costs related to a fundraising event held at the home
[or office] of the lobbyist, including the value of the use of the home [or office]
40
as a fundraising event venue.” Lobbyists remain entirely barred from making
41
contributions to elected state officials or candidates for state office.
82047.5, 82047.7 (defining the enumerated entities).
31. Id. §§ 82036, 84203.
32. Id. §§ 82036.5, 84203.5. “Independent expenditure” is “an expenditure made by any person . . . in
connection with a communication which expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate or the qualification, passage or defeat of a clearly identified measure, or taken as a whole and in
context, unambiguously urges a particular result in an election but which is not made to or at the behest of the
affected candidate or committee.” Id. § 82031.
33. Id. § 84200.
34. Id. §§ 91000, 91001.
35. Id. §§ 86100–86300. “‘Public official’ means every member, officer, employee or consultant of a
state or local government agency.” Id. § 82048(a).
36. Id. § 86203. A notable exception allows lobbyists to make gifts to family members. Id. § 82028(b)(3).
37. Id. § 89503. The FPPC adjusts this amount in accordance with the Consumer Price Index. Id.
38. Id. § 82015(f) (amended by Chapter 930); SB 1442, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on
Sept. 5, 2014, but not enacted); SB 1443, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 3, 2014, but
not enacted).
39. GOV’T § 82015(f) (amended by Chapter 930).
40. Id. § 82015(f)(2), (3) (amended by Chapter 930).
41. Id. § 85702 (West 2005).
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SB 1442, if Governor Brown had not vetoed it, would have required elected
officers and candidates for state office and committees receiving at least $1,000
in a calendar year to file campaign finance reports quarterly, twice as often as
42
previously required. It would have also subjected contributions or independent
43
expenditures over $1,000 to a twenty-four hour reporting requirement.
Furthermore, SB 1442 required the SOS to work with the FPPC to develop a
statewide electronic filing system that would have provided the public with all
44
records filed by specified entities with the SOS. The other changes offered by
SB 1442, including the switch to quarterly reporting requirements, would not
have become operative until after the SOS implemented this electronic filing
45
system.
If Governor Brown had not vetoed SB 1443 it would have prohibited
46
lobbyists from giving any gifts to elected officials. Additionally, the bill would
have reduced the aggregate value of gifts the PRA allowed public officials to
47
receive from a single source from $440 to $200. The bill also prohibited elected
officials, candidates, and legislative officials from accepting enumerated gifts,
including spa services, green fees, recreational trips, gift cards, and tickets to
48
concerts, sporting events, and theme parks.
IV. ANALYSIS
Robert Stern, the coauthor of the PRA, praised the CAPS Act as “the most
49
meaningful [group of] reform bills in two decades.” He also stated that he was
“extremely impressed that the Legislature had passed far-reaching legislation . . .
[and t]hat these bills would have vaulted California into the leadership of state
50
and federal lobbyist regulation.” However, Governor Brown vetoed two of the
three CAPS Act bills, citing, respectively, the technological infeasibility of SB

42. SB 1442 § 7, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 5, 2014, but not enacted).
43. Id. at §§ 1, 2.
44. Id. at § 19. Specified entities include committees, candidates, slate mailer organizations, multipurpose
organizations, and lobbyists. Id.
45. Id. at § 21.
46. SB 1443 § 1, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 3, 2014, but not enacted).
47. Id. Four-hundred-forty dollars is the adjusted gift value based on changes to the Consumer Price
Index. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 89503(f) (West 2005); Gift Limits and Honoraria, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES
COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.php?id=31 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). Under both current law and the
amendments proposed by SB 1443, gift restrictions only apply to local officials if they made a decision having a
“material financial effect” on the donor of the gift within twelve months of receiving the gift. GOV’T § 87103;
SB 1443 § 2, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 3, 2014, but not enacted).
48. Id. at § 3(g), (h), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 3, 2014, but not enacted).
49. Robert M. Stern, What Happened to Jerry Brown, the Reformer We Once Knew?, S.F. GATE (Oct. 9,
2014, 8:32 AM), www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/What-happened-toJerry-Brown-the-reformer-we5810178.php?cmpid=email-desktop#photo-6970668 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
50. Id.
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1442 and an imbalance between the “complexity” and the “commensurate
51
benefit” of SB 1443.
Part A discusses the impact of the closure of the fundraiser loophole, which
previously allowed a lobbyist to incur up to $500 in expenses for each fundraiser
52
held for an elected official if it occurred at the lobbyist’s home or office. Part B
analyzes the prospective consequences of more frequent reporting and upgrading
53
the current electronic database available to the public. Part C examines the
54
potential effect of a complete ban on lobbyist gifts to legislators. Part D offers
potential similar expansions to the PRA that were not addressed by the CAPS
55
Act.
A. Closing the Fundraiser Loophole
Scholars have long concerned themselves with the potential corrupting
influence of the lobbying process, especially when the exchange of money as a
56
gift or contribution occurs. Chapter 930 targeted the potential corrupting
influence of a monetary exchange between lobbyists and elected officials by
closing the loophole that allowed lobbyists who hosted fundraisers to donate up
57
to $500 of the cost of the fundraiser to the candidate. Speaking on behalf of her
own similar bill, Assemblymember Cristina Garcia explained, “It really makes no
sense that a lobbyist can’t buy lunch for a legislator for over $10, but can provide
elaborate, exclusive dinner parties simply by stating that it is under the $500 limit
58
. . . , [a]s we’ve seen these in-home lobbyist events fly under the legal radar.”
As a result, the FPPC and Common Cause, a political reform watchdog
organization, applauded these changes to the PRA as much-needed and long
59
overdue reforms. Additionally, Chapter 930 simplifies the law, enabling elected
officials and lobbyists alike to avoid inadvertent violations of the PRA caused by
60
lobbyist hosts failing to notify legislators when the $500 threshold was crossed.
51. SB 1442 Veto Message, supra note 23; SB 1443 Veto Message, supra note 23.
52. Infra Part VI.A.
53. Infra Part VI.B.
54. Infra Part VI.C.
55. Infra Part VI.D.
56. Werthheimer, supra note 1, at 1127. Former Senator Paul Douglas observed, “What happens is a
gradual shifting of a man’s loyalties from the community to those who have been doing his favors. His final
decisions are, therefore, made in response to his private friendships and loyalties rather than the public good.”
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 44 (1952).
57. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(f) (amended by Chapter 930).
58. Press Release, Office of Assemblymember Cristina Garcia, Assemblymember Garcia Introduces Bill
to Ban In-Home Lobbyist Fundraisers (Feb. 12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), available at
http://asmdc.org/members/a58/news-room/press-releases/assemblymember-garcia-introduces-bill-to-ban-inhome-lobbyist-fundraisers.
59. See Rosenhall, supra note 10 (noting that supporters such as Common Cause and the FPPC have
issued statements applauding the Legislators for enacting substantive changes to the PRA and explaining that
Chapter 930 will clarify for elected officials and lobbyists what is allowed by the law).
60. E-mail from Anthony Williams, supra note 19 (explaining that the warning letters sent by the FPPC
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While Chapter 930 may be a common-sense clarification of the law, it is not
61
clear that it addresses a significant problem. While the loophole allowed
lobbyists to effectively give candidates or elected officials the equivalent of
$500, individuals, businesses, and committees may give each candidate for the
State Assembly or Senate $4,100 per election, each candidate for a statewide
elected office $6,800 per election, and candidates for governor $27,200 per
62
election. As such, even if money does extoll a corrupting influence on politics,
$500 from a lobbyist is unlikely to have a significant impact compared to
63
contributors.
Rather than directly addressing the potential corrupting influence of money
in politics, Chapter 930 may be the type of legislation that is “aimed at restoring
the public’s confidence in the political system and ending the coverage of the
64
story in the media.” Thus, as public distrust of the government discourages civic
participation and creates a negative view of the democratic system, Chapter 930
may serve an important democratic purpose by restoring, in part, the public’s
65
faith in state government.
B. Increased Reporting: Burden or Benefit?
Senate Bill 1442 would have increased access to timely campaign
information by increasing the frequency of mandated reporting and improving
66
electronic access to reports. Currently, California’s campaign and lobbying
disclosure system, known as “Cal-Access,” is severely outdated and considered
67
one of the most antiquated transparency systems in the country. In a May 2014
to Legislators and the Governor were the result of a lobbyist failing to notify the elected officials that the $500
threshold was crossed).
61. Telephone Interview with Dan Schnur, supra note 20.
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85301 (West 2005); CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, CALIFORNIA
STATE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 1 (2012), available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/bulletin/007-Dec-2012State
ContributionLimitsChart.pdf.
63. NAT’L INST. OF MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/election-overview?s=
CA&y=2014, (last updated Nov. 20, 2014) (finding that “[i]n the California 2014 elections, candidates and
committees raised a total of $401,911,756,” or the equivalent of 803,823 $500 exploitations of the fundraiser
loophole).
64. E-mail from Alex Barrios, Communications Director in the State Senate, to Elizabeth Kim,
Greensheets Staff Writer, McGeorge Law Review (July 18, 2014, 5:17 PST) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
65. Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 1130; see E-mail from Alex Barrios, supra note 64 (noting that the
attention of the public and the media dissipates once legislation is passed that purports to address a problem,
regardless of the efficacy of that legislation).
66. SB 1442 §§ 7, 19, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 5, 2014, but not enacted);
Dominic Munoz, Several Bills Aim to Improve Transparency and Confidence in CA Elections, CAFWD.ORG (June
25, 2014), http://www.cafwd.org/reporting/entry/several-bills-aim-to-improve-transparency-and-confidence-in-caelections (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. Letter from The Cal. Forward Action Fund et al. to the Governor and Legislature of California (May
20, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/225669250/CalAccess-FPPC-Joint-Letter. Because increased filing requirements would not become operative until after the
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letter to Governor Brown and the State Legislature, the California Forward
Action Fund, California Common Cause, the Institute of Governmental
Advocates, the California Newspaper Publishers Association, the Sunlight
Foundation, and the League of Women Voters of California requested the
68
Governor and SOS prioritize the modernizing of the inefficient system. Critics
complain the system is difficult to navigate, lessening the public’s access to
important campaign information and, in effect, reducing the efficacy of
69
disclosure requirements. In 2013, Governor Brown said, “There is no doubt the
current system—widely viewed as outdated and cumbersome—needs
70
upgrading.”
In September 2014, the SOS urged Governor Brown to sign SB 1442,
emphasizing the need to improve the “obsolete operating and database
management systems that are no longer supported by the information technology
71
community.” Further, the SOS acknowledged that the current system, at times,
72
has acted as “an obstacle to enhanced campaign disclosure.”
Despite the widely recognized need for this system upgrade, Governor
73
Brown vetoed SB 1442. The Governor’s veto message initially states, “While
the goal of reducing reports is laudable, until we have the technology in place, it
74
is premature to make adjustments to the reporting schedule.” Although SB 1442
would eliminate some supplemental reporting requirements, SB 1442 would
likely increase aggregate reporting by moving from semiannual to quarterly
75
reporting requirements. Additionally, as SB 1442 would require that SOS
complete the technology upgrade prior to the reporting changes becoming
operative, it is unclear why SB 1442 would make premature adjustments to
76
reporting requirements.

electronic reporting system is improved, those requirements will not further harm the already outdated system.
SB 1442 § 21, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 5, 2014, but not enacted).
68. Letter from The Cal. Forward Action Fund et al. to the Governor and Legislature of California, supra
note 67.
69. Alisha Green, It’s Time to Improve Access to Influence Data in California, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION
(May 22, 2014), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/05/22/its-time-to-improve-access-to-influence-datain-california/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
70. Alexandra Bjerg, Cal-Access Upgrades Shelved with Governor Brown’s Veto of Campaign Finance
Bill, CAL. FORWARD ACTION FUND (OCT. 9, 2013), http://www.cafwd.org/reporting/entry/cal-access-upgradeshelved-with-governor-browns-veto-of-campaign-finan.
71. Letter from Debra Bowen, California Secretary of State, to Governor Edmund G. Brown (Sept. 3,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
72. Id.
73. SB 1442 Veto Message, supra note 23.
74. Id.
75. See SB 1442 §§ 3–18, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 5, 2014, but not
enacted) (removing less used used supplemental reports while mandating that most entities currently reporting
semiannually begin reporting quarterly).
76. See id. (The new reporting requirements “shall become operative on January 1 of the year following
the year in which the statewide Internet-based system established [by section 19 of SB 1442] becomes
operational, as certified by the Secretary of State.”).
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The veto message also explains, “Before an additional information
technology project is authorized, the SOS should complete the two substantial
77
projects currently underway.” The first of these projects is a $98,000,000
project to create a centralized voter registration database, projected for
78
completion in 2016. The second project is a $26,000,000 project to develop and
consolidate automated systems currently used by the SOS and is also projected
79
for completion in 2016. As the SOS urged Governor Brown to sign SB 1442,
80
they likely believed that the assignment of a third project would be manageable.
C. Does the Disclosure of Gifts Mitigate their Corrupting Influence?
SB 1443, if enacted, would have completely barred lobbyists from giving
Legislators gifts and significantly reduced the value of gifts each legislator could
81
have received from a single source. However, SB 1443 was also vetoed by the
Governor, who stated, “Proper disclosure, as already provided by law, should be
82
sufficient to guard against undue influence.” However, this relies on the premise
that gift disclosure reports are readily available to the public—a premise
83
challenged by the currently poor state of Cal-Access.
The Governor’s veto message also ignores the importance of promoting the
84
public’s trust in its government. Even if Governor Brown’s premise that
disclosure is a sufficient tool with which to deter undue influence is true, the
common practice of giving elected officials tickets to sold-out shows and
85
sporting events has raised significant concerns from the public. In 2013, state
86
elected officials received over $32,000 in entertainment and sports tickets.
While Governor Brown believed that SB 1443 would add unnecessary

77. SB 1442 Veto Message, supra note 23.
78. Reportable IT Projects—Project Number 0890-046, CAL. DEP’T OF TECH., http://www.ocio.ca.gov/
Government/IT_Policy/IT_Projects/ProjectDetails.html?work_guid=0x999BB70A3653B74CBC94B0666A2EB
758&WorkItem=0x999BB70A3653B74CBC94B0666A2EB758 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
79. Reportable IT Projects—Project Number 0890-047, CAL. DEP’T OF TECH., http://www.ocio.ca.gov/
Government/IT_Policy/IT_Projects/ProjectDetails.html?work_guid=0xAD5FD8A19BE15440A03EE53C7226
CCA7&WorkItem=0xAD5FD8A19BE15440A03EE53C7226CCA7 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
80. Letter from Debra Bowen to Governor Edmund G. Brown, supra note 71.
81. SB 1443 § 1, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sept. 3, 2014, but not enacted).
82. SB 1443 Veto Message, supra note 23. In support of this argument, Governor Brown referenced The
Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, American Government, and Moral Escalation, by Bayless
Manning, written in 1964. Id.
83. See Letter from Debra Bowen to Governor Edmund G. Brown, supra note 71 (explaining that CalAccess in its current state has acted as an obstacle to disclosure); see also supra Part VI.B.
84. Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 1131 (“[P]ublic mistrust of government discourages citizen participation
and leads individuals to believe they have no voice in government.”).
85. See David Zahniser, Most L.A. Ethics Commissioners Say City Officials Should Report the Value of
Gift Tickets, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/14/local/la-me-gifts-20100714 (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that in 2010 the Los Angeles Ethics Commission began requiring
local officials to disclose the value of the free tickets they receive).
86. PHILLIP UNG, CAL. COMMON CAUSE, GIFTS, INFLUENCE, & POWER 6 (Dec. 2013).
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complexity to reporting requirements that would fail to justify the minimal, if
any, gained protection against undue influence, it is unclear what impact SB 1443
87
would have had on the public’s trust in their government. Ultimately, the veto
of SB 1443 disappointed many who believed the gift ban was a necessary step in
combating undue influence from interest groups and increasing public trust in
88
government.
D. Shortcomings of the CAPS Act
Even before Governor Brown’s vetoes, commentators criticized the CAPS
Act for failing to impose a limit on gifts of travel given to legislators, gifts those
89
commentators argue create significant conflicts of interest.
Foreign
governments, nonprofits, and interest groups gave California lawmakers more
90
than $550,000 in free travel in 2013. Payments for a legislator’s travel expenses
91
are not considered gifts if they meet two requirements. First, the travel must be
“reasonably related to a legislative or governmental purpose, or to an issue of
92
state, national, or international public policy.” Secondly, the travel expenses
must be associated with a speech given by the public official and limited to
expenses incurred the day before, day of, and day after the speech, or, if a
federally recognized nonprofit organization or an equivalent party pays the travel
93
expenses. Exempt travel expenses include airfare, hotels, meals, and cultural
94
excursions that may last for weeks. Critics claim that interest groups fund
95
nonprofits who then sponsor events and trips that meet the requirements above.
96
Additionally, these trips provide lobbyists with full access to public officials.
However, Robert Stern, a coauthor of the PRA, explained that if the trips are
important, the state should pay for them because conflicts of interest may arise
when interest groups give money to nonprofits who pay for legislator travel costs
97
without disclosure.
87. SB 1443 Veto Message, supra note 23.
88. See Stern, supra note 49 (noting the public’s overwhelming support for political reform and sharing
his own disappointment in the bills’ vetoes).
89. Jeremy White, Lawmakers Enjoyed $550,000 Worth of Paid Travel in 2013, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar.
5, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/03/04/6209174/California-lawmakers-enjoyed-550000.html (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (raising concerns over other types of unregulated gifts); Telephone Interview with
Dan Schnur, supra note 20 (stating that the CAPS Act did not fully address gifts that may give rise to conflict of
interests problems and often times this kind of legislation is used to placate the press and the public).
90. White, supra note 89.
91. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 89506(a) (West 2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. UNG, supra note 86, at 9; see Rosenhall, supra, note 10 (noting that lawmakers visited Hawaii,
Switzerland, Brazil, Poland, Norway, Taiwan, Israel, China, Armenia, Sweden, and South Korea).
95. UNG, supra note 86, at 9.
96. Id.
97. White, supra note 89 (“If the trip is important, the state should pay for it. But I have a problem with
the travel if it’s not disclosed where money is coming from, and that special interests that are giving to
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However, lawmakers have justified the trips as educational ventures that help
them serve their constituencies better and enrich their understandings of public
98
policies. Senator Lara, who introduced two of the CAPS Act bills, explained,
“As we conduct business as the eighth largest economy in the world, we have to
see what other countries are doing, especially in the issues of energy and
99
environmental innovation.” At the press conference to announce the
introduction of the CAPS Act, reporters asked the members of the Senate
Working Group on Ethics to distinguish between what gifts are appropriate and
100
what are not. Senator De León responded, “We do not live in a world of
absolutes. The reality is that we have to participate in community activities as a
State Senator. No one should have to pay for meals out of pocket, just to
101
participate in their work duties that they have to perform, day in and day out.”
Senator De León further stated that he and his fellow Legislators worked closely
with the FPPC to identify the gifts that are the “most egregious and indefensible”
102
and to target those gifts with the CAPS Act.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the scandals that rocked the Senate in 2014, the state
Legislature passed meaningful political reform bills that could have reestablished
103
some of the public’s trust in government. However, in July 2014 an editorial in
the San Jose Mercury News noted that public interest in political reform had
104
already faded. Alex Barrios, a Communications Director in the State Senate,
explained, “From the perspective of the media, a problem was uncovered and a
solution was passed into law . . . . From the perspective of the [L]egislature,
105
resolution was achieved and the press will then focus on covering other issues.”
With little remaining interest from the public, the media, or the Legislature,
106
Governor Brown vetoed two of the three bills comprising the CAPS Act.
Legal misconduct by public officials erodes the trust the public has in its
107
108
government. Public trust is vital for good governance. Chapter 930 should
nonprofits are paying for travel.”).
98. Ricardo Lara, Press Conference Announcing CAPS Act (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MUP2rT7DNvo (transcript on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Stern, supra note 49.
104. Editorial, California Legislature Financial Reforms Fall Way Short, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 7,
2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26102969/mercury-news-editorial-california-legislature-financialreforms-fall (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
105. Email from Alex Barrios, supra note 64.
106. SB 1442 Veto Message, supra note 23; SB 1443 Veto Message, supra note 23.
107. Ed Coghlan, CA Fwd to Legislators: Act Now to Restore Public Trust in Government, CAL
FORWARD (April 8, 2014), http://www.cafwd.org/reporting/entry/ca-fwd-to-legislators-act-now-to-restore-
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increase the public’s trust in government as it closes a loophole exploited by
109
lobbyists. However, Governor Brown’s vetoes, if noticed by the public, would
110
only serve to erode the public’s trust further. Barrios observed, “Until the
public pays closer attention to what goes on in the Capitol and whether bills that
are passed into law actually solve real problems, this is the type of governance
111
we can expect in these kinds of situations.” Therefore, increasing the public’s
trust of government may first require increasing public scrutiny of the legislative
112
process to ensure reform bills both are effective and eventually become law.

public-trust-in-government (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
108. See id. (discussing the critical importance of trust in effective governance).
109. E-mail from Alex Barrios, supra note 64.
110. See Coghlan, supra note 107 (explaining the importance of reform to establishing public trust in
government).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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